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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay specifically addresses the conference presentations of 
Professors Barak Richman and Tim Greaney, but also shares my own 
views on the current state of antitrust enforcement in health care, 
including current challenges and potential reforms. 
In summary, both Professors Richman and Greaney seemed critical of 
 
* Partner, Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP.  Pursuant to the 2016 Symposium on Reconciling 
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care that the American Bar Association and the 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law cosponsored, I was asked to provide comments on 
Professors Tim Greaney’s and Barak Richman’s presentations at the conference.  I very much 
appreciate the opportunity to participate in a panel discussion with these esteemed academics. 
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the antitrust laws and argued that the antitrust laws failed to prevent the 
level of concentration that we see in the health care industry today, or that 
they are poorly suited to regulate anticompetitive conduct related to the 
pharmaceutical industry.  I disagree.  Antitrust jurisprudence is an 
enforcement tool available to state and federal agencies, as well as to 
private citizens.  And agencies and private citizens use these laws in 
traditional and novel ways to challenge anticompetitive conduct.  The 
outcome of enforcement actions, however, depends in large part on the 
specific facts and circumstances of each individual case.  This is the 
benefit of the case-based nature of the competition regulation and this 
approach arguably prevents antitrust laws from having a chilling effect 
on growth, innovation, and the achievement of economic efficiencies. 
This Essay argues that antitrust laws are not to blame for the perceived 
high levels of concentration in certain health care markets and maintains 
that the United States should not abandon these laws in favor of 
alternatives.  The beauty of the antitrust laws is that they are applicable 
to all industries (with very few exceptions), and before a court can rule 
the combination or conduct unlawful, it must conduct a rigorous analysis 
into the facts, circumstances, and actual or potential outcomes of 
combinations or conduct at issue—there are very few bright-line rules 
that apply in antitrust jurisprudence. 
I.  RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RICHMAN’S PRESENTATION: THE LIMITS OF, 
AND ALTERNATIVES TO, ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 
One can interpret Professor Richman’s conference presentation as 
arguing that antitrust law may not appropriately or adequately address 
competitive concerns related to “product hopping.”1  Product hopping is 
the practice of extending a pharmaceutical product’s exclusive 
intellectual property rights by introducing a modified version of the 
original product before (or just as) the original formulation is set to lose 
its patent protection.  Professor Richman’s presentation offered 
alternative solutions to antitrust law aimed to address the concerns 
regarding reduced competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace raised 
by this practice, including alternative regulatory, policy, or other 
solutions that may be better suited than antitrust enforcement to address 
this issue.  For example, some alternatives to antitrust law to improve the 
competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry suggested by Professor 
Richman include: (1) improved administrative procedures at the United 
 
1. Barak D. Richman, Professor, Duke University School of Law, Presentation at the American 
Bar Association and Loyola University Chicago School of Law’s Symposium: Reconciling 
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care (Sept. 20, 2016). 
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States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”); (2) better regulatory 
regimes governing drug substitution laws; and (3) increased pressure 
imposed by health plans on physicians and patients to encourage more 
cost-conscious decision making. 
Although these alternatives may potentially enhance marketplace 
competition, it would be misplaced to abandon the use of antitrust laws 
to enforce against anticompetitive conduct.  For example, the most 
notable case on “product hopping” thus far is the New York Attorney 
General’s case against Actavis (formerly Forrest Laboratories), related to 
its product extension strategy for its Namenda product—a drug for the 
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease.2  In New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. 
Actavis PLC, the Second Circuit upheld the finding that Actavis’ conduct 
related to Namenda was unlawful under the antitrust laws.3  This Essay 
posits that Actavis is a practical example of the successful prosecution of 
anticompetitive conduct under the antitrust laws, and would suggest that 
alternative approaches to regulation are neither more efficient than 
antitrust laws nor better suited to prevent unlawful conduct similar to the 
unlawful activity in Actavis. 
A.  Are USPTO Reforms Better Than Antitrust Laws? 
Professor Richman suggests that the USPTO could revise its processes 
to deny patents for immaterial innovations or reformulations.4  
Theoretically this might work, but this Essay suggests that such reforms 
are neither easily enacted nor enforced.  Even if the USPTO is the right 
place for these types of determinations, it is not clear whether this would 
actually prevent anticompetitive “product hops.” 
In Actavis, the reformulation involved a switch from a twice-a-day 
immediate release formulation to a once-a-day extended release product.5  
The New York Attorney General’s complaint in Actavis interestingly did 
not focus on the issue of whether the extended-release (“Namenda XR”) 
formulation was truly innovative or a material improvement over the 
immediate-release (“Namenda IR”) formulation.  In its prosecution under 
the antitrust laws, the Attorney General posed that the court did not need 
to reach this issue.6  Rather, the court looked at the conduct of Actavis as 
 
2. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015). 
3. Id. at 659 (holding that “the combination of withdrawing a successful drug from the market 
and introducing a reformulated version of that drug, which has the dual effect of forcing patients to 
switch to the new version and impeding generic competition, without a legitimate business 
justification, violates [section] 2 of the Sherman Act”). 
4. Richman, supra note 1. 
5. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 642–43. 
6. Brief for the Appellee, Actavis, 787 F.3d 638 (No. 14-4624), 2015 WL 1010525 (C.A.2) (“If 
there were any non-pretexual, efficiency-related, procompetitive justification for defendants’ 
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a monopolist to determine whether its actions constituted anticompetitive 
conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act.7  The New York District 
Court found that forgoing profits from sales of Namenda IR for the 
purpose of constructing a barrier to entry for generics was the exact type 
of conduct prohibited under the Sherman Act.8  Therefore, it was 
irrelevant whether Namenda XR was a material improvement or 
innovation over Namenda IR (i.e., the original formulation).9 
The Namenda reformulation was arguably a material innovation from 
the original Namenda IR formulation and, as a result, the current 
regulations and processes of the USPTO granted additional patent 
protection to the reformulated product.  It is unclear whether Richman’s 
suggested reforms at the USPTO can address the specific issues that arise 
in the “product hopping” context without potentially curbing the 
incentive for innovators to introduce new and improved versions of 
legacy products.  In other words, if the USPTO raises the bar for obtaining 
additional patent protection for new formulations or improvements to 
existing pharmaceutical products, the obvious concern is that 
pharmaceutical companies would not invest in important modifications 
to existing products because of a lack of adequate intellectual property 
protection. 
B.  Are Improvements in Regulation of Drug Substitution a Solution? 
Professor Richman also indicated that state drug substitution laws 
should be more relaxed so that pharmacists have a greater ability to 
substitute generic pharmaceuticals not necessarily AB-rated by the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).10  An AB rating indicates whether a 
drug is therapeutically equivalent to another approved pharmaceutical 
product.  Although relaxing state drug substitution laws could ultimately 
make it easier for generics to compete against branded drugs, particularly 
when a branded company introduces a new formulation for which no 
generic is yet available, changing substitution laws raises other concerns.  
Most importantly, it puts the discretion in the hands of the pharmacists to 
determine appropriate substitutes for the prescribed product.  This would 
effectively require thousands of pharmacists across the country to step 
into the role of the FDA in terms of determining whether any particular 
generic drug is appropriate to be dispensed as a substitute for the 
 
exclusionary conduct, it would be weighed against the anticompetitive effects of the conduct to 
determine whether [section] 2 liability is appropriate.”). 
7. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 655–58. 
8. Id. at 658. 
9. Id. at 658–59. 
10. Richman, supra note 1. 
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prescribed branded drug. 
C.  Can Payor Pressure on Physicians and Patients Create a More 
Competitive Environment for Pharmaceuticals? 
Health care payors need to play a role in bending the cost curve of 
health care by holding physicians and patients accountable for their 
choices of providers, location for care, and pharmaceuticals.  But one of 
the greatest challenges in this area is the lack of transparency and 
accountability in terms of who is paying for health care services and what 
those services or products actually cost.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
health care markets are concentrated either at the provider level or payor 
level, the drive to innovate is potentially stifled.  For example, if a payor 
enjoys a market where there is relatively little competition, then it may 
not feel the competitive pressure to lower prices or create new product 
designs that shift responsibility downstream to the provider or patient.  
Put simply, why would a large payor worry about pressuring physicians 
and patients to make better, lower-cost choices as to pharmaceuticals, if 
in doing so, the payor might risk losing consumers and, in turn, market 
share? 
Rather than swapping out the antitrust laws in favor of merely relying 
on payors to pressure physicians and patients to make better choices, we 
should advocate for increased transparency in all aspects of health care, 
including payors, providers, pharmaceuticals and pharmacy benefit 
managers.  We need better tools to educate providers—as prescribers and 
referral sources—and consumers on the costs of different services or 
products.  And, for purposes of antitrust enforcement, we need better 
tools at the agencies to recognize and credit innovative and disruptive 
actors that are trying to drive improvement in the pharmaceutical 
marketplace, health plan products, or health care delivery systems, and 
that will shake up entrenched payors and provider systems that hold high 
market shares. 
II.  RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GREANEY’S PRESENTATION: ANTITRUST 
AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO DOMINANT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
AND PAYORS  
Professor Greaney’s symposium presentation suggested that antitrust 
laws are important, but limited in their ability to address the issues of 
payor or provider market power in health care markets that arise through 
mergers or consolidation.11  He claimed that judicial errors contributed 
 
11. Thomas Greaney, Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, Presentation at the 
American Bar Association and Loyola University Chicago School of Law’s Symposium: Antitrust 
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to the current concentration levels of health systems and health plans, and 
that attempts by regulators, at the state level, to regulate prices and other 
competitive dynamics (e.g., quality and efficiency) through legislation 
have been inadequate in stemming rising costs in health care.  Professor 
Greaney proposed that the better approach would be for antitrust 
regulators to target the conduct of payors and health care providers with 
high market shares to prevent anticompetitive behavior of these entities. 
A.  Has Antitrust Enforcement “Abjectly Failed to Lower Provider 
Prices” Thereby Failing to Preserve Competitive Markets? 
The idea that antitrust laws are solely responsible for lowering provider 
rates places a very high and undue burden on the antitrust laws.  Instead, 
one must recognize that health care in the United States is a heavily 
regulated industry, and the government itself is the largest payor.  Just 
scratching the surface of government regulation over health care would 
reveal that: (1) the FDA is responsible for the process, review, and 
eventual approval of new drug applications and new medical devices; (2) 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, along with state 
agencies, regulate providers with respect to reimbursement rates for the 
Medicare and Medicaid populations, and prices of pharmaceuticals for a 
similar population; and (3) state insurance commissioners regulate health 
insurance plans and, in certain states, the health insurance exchange 
market.  Because of the interplay of regulatory bodies in the United 
States’ health care system, it is overzealous to blame antitrust laws for 
failing to protect against increases in provider rates and health care costs.  
In fact, no single regulatory regime or body of law can adequately solve 
all the issues regarding pricing, quality, and competition that arise in our 
health care system. 
B.  How Can Antitrust Laws Impact Future Consolidation? 
As for antitrust laws and their enforcement, this Essay posits that there 
is an important need for better tools to distinguish anticompetitive 
transactions from procompetitive or neutral consolidation in the health 
care field.  Specifically, antitrust analysis requires tools that can more 
accurately anticipate whether consolidation will lead to price increases 
versus greater price competition, and tools that can predict the potential 
for benefits to patients from enhanced quality or increased innovation in 
health care delivery or payment methodologies. 
What does it mean to develop “better tools?”  In practice, when health 
care providers or payors consolidate, the procompetitive rationale is 
 
and Regulatory Responses to Dominance in Health Care (Sept. 20, 2016). 
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typically related to opportunities to improve efficiency or quality in the 
delivery system or scale and efficiency in the payor market.  At present, 
there is a lack of appropriate ways to measure and test the potential and 
likelihood for these efficiencies, particularly around quality gains and 
innovation.  This Essay proposes that current methods for evaluating 
price effects and quality impacts from consolidation need to evolve to 
remain relevant in a changing health care landscape.  In particular, 
antitrust enforcers need to consider how to evaluate and credit arguments 
of improved quality and innovation, which are particularly notable as 
hospitals and physicians form more integrated delivery systems and 
health plans adopt new payment models that can have a real impact on 
improving health care outcomes and lowering costs. 
CONCLUSION 
In considering Professors Greaney’s and Richman’s presentations, I 
was struck by how critical both professors were of the antitrust laws and 
their alleged failings with respect to protecting competition in the health 
care system.  This Essay posits that the antitrust laws are not the only 
factor influencing our health care system such that they can be blamed 
entirely for the system’s failings.  Rather, antitrust laws have played, and 
will continue to play, an important role as health care delivery and 
coverage continue to evolve in this country.  The facts of the situation are 
critical in every instance in which the antitrust laws are applied to health 
care consolidations or conduct.  The importance of facts in antitrust law 
is evident in Actavis where the facts led the court to conclude that conduct 
at issue violated the antitrust laws.12  The same can be said for antitrust 
enforcement in health system consolidations—these cases and therefore 
judicial decisions in this area largely turn on the facts as they fit into the 
antitrust doctrine. 
 
12. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 659–60. 
